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“No reform of the UN will be complete without
the reform of the Security Council”.
- Former Secretary-General of the United Nations Koﬁ Annan.
1 Introduction
The United Nations (UN) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance
of international peace and security. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is its most powerful
organ, with the authority to make legally binding resolutions to fulfil its mandate of main-
taining international peace and security. To that end, it can suspend economic and diplomatic
relations between countries, impose blockades, and authorize the use of armed force.
Our study appraises possible reforms to the UNSC’s collective choice processes. Since its
beginnings in 1946, the UNSC has undergone reform only once: in 1963, the UN General
Assembly (UNGA)—which includes delegates from all UN member countries—voted to
expand the UNSC from 11 to 15 members (UNGA 1963).1 Momentum for a second round of
reform can be traced to 1993, when anOpen-endedWorkingGroup (OEWG)was established
to explore proposals for UNSC reform.2 ThisWorking Group, now often dubbed the “Never-
ending Working Group”, has entered its 24th consecutive year of deliberations.
This paper presents, to our knowledge, the first formal quantitative study of the equity
and efficiency properties of a wide range of proposals that are under consideration by
world leaders, having been put forward by a variety of actors within the UN. We apply new
formal equity measures developed in Gould and Rablen (2016) to understand the effects of
eight “structural reforms” contained within these proposals, as well as the separate effects
of expanding the UNSC membership. A key aspect of the implementation is a computer
simulation of UNSC membership under each structural reform.
Under the present arrangements, the 15 UNSC members comprise five Permanent
Members (PMs)—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—that
are ever-present and wield a veto on all non-procedural matters. The remaining ten
members are elected Non-Permanent Members (NPMs), who serve time-limited 2-year
terms. The ten NPM seats are divided between five regional caucusing groups: one country
from Eastern Europe (EE); two countries from each of the Western European and Others
Group (WEOG), the Latin America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC—el Grupo Lati-
noamericano y Caribeño) and Asia; and three countries from Africa.3
Two distinct sets of criticisms are widely levelled against these arrangements: one relating to
the efﬁciency with which they allow the UNSC to respond to its member’s preferences, and
another relating to thedegree towhich theyachievedemocratic equity in the allocationofpower.4
On efficiency grounds, critics argue that the UNSC is too often impotent, not least
because a preference against a resolution by a single PM can override a preference for the
1 The reform did not come into effect until 1965, however.
2 In full, the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council (OEWG 1994). The call for the creation of the OEWG in UNGA
(1993) followed an overwhelming response to an earlier UNGA Resolution (UNGA 1992), which invited
members to submit written comments on a possible review of the UNSC.
3 See Appendix 3 for the full membership of each of the regional groups (excluding PMs). Of the PMs,
China is a member in Asia, Russia in EE, and France and the United Kingdom in the WEOG. Technically,
the United States is not a member of any regional group, but it attends meetings of the WEOG as an observer
and is considered to be a member of that group for electoral purposes (UN 2012a). For the purposes of this
paper, therefore, we give the United States membership in the WEOG.
4 Perhaps owing to disenfranchisement within the organization, many countries fail to pay their assessed
contributions: as of the end of 2011, the UN was owed $454 million by member states (UN 2012b).
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resolution by all remaining members. For instance, the UNSC is presently under criticism
for its inability to respond decisively to the conflict in Syria. The UNSC also has appeared
slow to react to earlier conflicts, notably the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Barnett 2002). This
lack of efficiency has sometimes led countries to bypass the UNSC in favor of alternative
multilateral action, which is observed in the ongoing Syrian conflict and in previous
conflicts. For instance, in 1999 NATO undertook military action in Kosovo, and in 2003
the United States and its allies invaded Iraq, on both occasions lacking a UNSC mandate.
On democratic equity grounds, it is widely acknowledged that the UNSC needs to be
seen as fair and legitimate in order to effectively fulfill its mandate (Frey and Stutzer 2006;
Stutzer and Frey 2006; Marchetti 2008; Cowling et al. 2010). Critics (e.g., Russett et al.
1996; Hammer 2002; Schwartzberg 2003; Annan 2005; Blum 2005) raise two distinct sets
of issues, one relating to equity at the country level, and the other relating to equity at the
level of regions. Assessing these claims, the study of Gould and Rablen (2016) finds that, at
the level of countries, the conjunction of preferential voting power when a member of the
UNSC and the right to be ever-present gives the PMs substantially too much representa-
tion. There is thus a need to dilute the representation of the PMs. At the level of regions,
the authors also uncover significant levels of inequity—Asia and Africa are both sub-
stantially underrepresented, while EE and the WEOG are both heavily overrepresented.
This implies a broader representational imbalance between North (EE and the WEOG) and
South (Africa, Asia and the GRULAC).
We appraise eight proposed reforms to the UNSC’s rules (“structural” reforms) that
appear within 11 recent reform proposals. We then analyze separately the impact of
expanding the membership of the UNSC above the current 15 members through the
addition of new NPM seats. We find disappointing results for the structural reforms
considered: only one of the eight improve upon the status quo in both the equity and
efficiency dimensions, one leaves efficiency unchanged and improves equity, five leave
efficiency unchanged but worsen equity, and one strictly worsens both equity and effi-
ciency. Enlarging the UNSC’s membership does permit an improvement in equity, but is
no panacea, for it comes at the price of worsened efficiency. Moreover, the equity gains
from expansion display diminishing returns, while the costs in terms of lost efficiency
display increasing returns.
Of the 11 reform proposals we consider (which typically bundle one or more structural
reforms with some degree of membership expansion), we again find that only one is
superior to the status quo in both the equity and efficiency dimensions. We show that a
simple dominance criterion ranks all but three of the 11 reform proposals (by this criterion
the remaining eight reforms may be disregarded).
The most promising structural reform we consider is to require two PMs to vote against
a resolution for a veto to be effective. This reform improves both equity and efficiency, but,
like any proposal for reform of the UNSC, faces severe political constraints. Overall, we
fail to see that any of the reform proposals presently under consideration will (or should)
break the reform impasse.
Earlier quantitative studies of UNSC reform include Volacu (2015), Hosli et al. (2011),
Strand and Rapkin (2011), O’Neill (1996) and Kerby and Gøberler (1996). In the absence
of a formal theoretical framework for measuring equity in such bodies, or for addressing
issues relating to region- and country-specific notions of equity, these studies describe the
implications of different reforms for the voting power of a PM relative to a NPM, often
focusing on the ratio of these quantities. As equity in the UNSC is a function of how often
countries gain membership as well as the voting rights they exercise when a member,
however, approaches that focus on only one of these dimensions give only a partial view.
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This point is of particular relevance as several of the reforms we shall consider vary only
the probabilities of UN membership, leaving voting rights unchanged. In capturing both of
these dimensions, the theoretical framework of Gould and Rablen (2016) permits, for the
first time, a formal quantitative assessment of the equitability of UNSC reforms for both
individual countries and regions, and of how equity interacts with efficiency.
As in Gould and Rablen (2016), we allow for countries to abstain in UNSC voting. In
contrast, the studies cited above, and many precursors in the literature (e.g., Shapley and
Shubik 1954; Straffin 1983, 1993), model the UNSC’s decision rule as permitting members
to vote for or against a resolution only. As discussed in Felsenthal and Machover (1997)
and Freixas and Zwicker (2003), however, the UNSC’s decision rule cannot be faithfully
represented in this way. The difficulty is that the UN Charter states that decisions over non-
procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine or more UNSC members,
including the concurring votes of the PMs. A “concurring” vote has come to be under-
stood, in practice, as either an affirmative vote or an abstention (see, e.g., Blum 2005,
p. 636), so a negative vote by a PM is distinct from an abstention. When ignoring the
distinct role of abstention, a PM is calculated to be ten times as powerful as a NPM under
the Banzhaf index of voting power, whereas, when properly accounting for abstention, a
PM is only around twice as powerful.
Last, in analyzing reform of the UNSC, this paper contributes to a wider literature that
uses measures of a priori voting power to appraise reform options for international voting
bodies. Examples include Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 2004, 2007) and Leech (2002a),
who analyze reform of the Council of the European Union; Manno (1966), Newcombe
et al. (1971) and Dixon (1983), who analyze reform of the UNGA; and Leech (2002b),
Leech and Leech (2013) and Rapkin and Strand (2006), who analyze reform of the IMF’s
Executive Board.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Sect. 2 sets out the theoretical framework; Sect. 3
outlines the structural reforms we consider, and their associated reform proposals; Sect. 4
details the simulation analysis; Sect. 5 presents the results; and Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Equity and efﬁciency in the UNSC
The UNSC in its current form (and under the structural reforms we consider) may be
represented as a Council Voting Game (CVG), as proposed by Gould and Rablen (2016).
In a CVG, an “assembly” assigns (by election or otherwise) a time-varying subset of its
members to a “council”. For the purposes of this paper the assembly should be interpreted
as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the main deliberative body of the UN
containing all 193 of its members, and the council should be interpreted as the UNSC. We
partition the UNGA into regional groups Rj, and we denote by aij the ith country of region
j. We allow for the (reformed) UNSC to have different membership categories, indexed by
k. To encompass the various reform proposals, we distinguish membership categories by,
for instance, the way in which membership is attained (by Charter—as applies to the
category of PM—or by election), the length of term, the provision for immediate reelection
and voting rights.
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2.1 Equity in the UNSC
We model democratic equity according to the approach developed in Gould and Rablen
(2016). We therefore only sketch the approach here, and refer the interested reader to
Gould and Rablen (2016) for further details.
2.1.1 Equity concepts
Our basic normative notion of democratic equity is that, from behind a veil of ignorance as
to what a citizen’s preference is, and to which country or region they belong, a citizen
should be equally able to influence outcomes in the UNSC. This criterion is referred to in
Gould and Rablen as the “equalization of voting power” criterion (for brevity, the EVP
criterion). Crucially, we require that the EVP criterion hold before the assignment of
countries to the UNSC occurs. That is, we require that expected voting power (before it is
known which countries will vote in the UNSC) be equal across citizens. This notion of
equity acknowledges that the democratic power of a world citizen in the UNSC depends
not only on the voting rights of his or her country when it is a member of the UNSC, but
also on how frequently his or her country is a UNSC member.
A strong interpretation of the EVP criterion requires it to hold for each and every
resolution. This implies, for instance, that a country with a lower assignment probability in
a given year must, by way of compensation, receive more voting power on the UNSC if it
is assigned. We, however, employ the so-called weak form of the EVP criterion, which
allows for deviations from the EVP criterion in any one year, so long as deviations offset
across an infinite sequence of years. Intuitively, the weak form permits inter-temporal
shifting of assignment probability and voting rights: a country with, e.g., a lower average
assignment probability must be compensated for longer expected spells outside the UNSC
by the exercise of greater voting power when a UNSC member.
2.1.2 The democratic decision-making process
To measure the proximity of the UNSC under each reform to the EVP criterion we embed
the UNSC into a stylized democratic decision-making process that maps the preferences of
citizens to UNSC decisions. To analyze differing notions of country-level equity (CE) and
region-level equity (RE) we introduce two such decision-making processes: the “country”
process (CDP) and the “region” process (RDP). Under the CDP countries on the UNSC are
assumed a priori to represent only their national populations, allowing us to investigate
equity at the country level. Under the region process (RDP) countries are assumed a priori
to act on the UNSC as regional representatives, permitting us to investigate equity at the
level of regions.
For a given resolution, the CDP comprises three stages. In Stage 1, a national ballot is
held in each country. In Stage 2 a subset of countries is (randomly) assigned to the UNSC
from each region. In Stage 3, the UNSC members vote in the UNSC according to the
outcomes of their national ballots in Stage 1. In contrast, in the RDP, a single regional
ballot is held in each region in Stage 1. In Stage 2 a subset of countries is assigned to the
UNSC from each region. In Stage 3, the UNSC members vote as regional blocs on the
UNSC, each bloc voting according to the outcome of the regional ballot in Stage 1.5
5 As, in the context of region equity, we are specifically interested in understanding the representation of
regions as cohesive entities it is appropriate in this context to disregard the possibility—which might be very
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The rules of the national (regional) ballots in Stage 1 under the CDP (RDP) are as
follows. Citizens may vote either {for, abstain, against} and the outcome space is {mandate
to vote “for” on the UNSC (mandate for), no mandate, mandate to vote “against” on the
UNSC (mandate against)}. In the event that “no mandate” obtains, the country (or regional
bloc under the RDP) is assumed to abstain in the UNSC.
Following Gould and Rablen (2016) we employ a majority threshold rule of the fol-
lowing form: for “mandate for” to obtain, (i) more citizens must vote “for” than vote
“against”; and (ii) at least a proportion τ ∈ [0,1] of all eligible voters must vote “for”. For
“mandate against” to obtain, (i) more citizens must vote “against” than vote “for”; and (ii)
at least a proportion τ of all eligible voters must vote “against”. In all other eventualities,
“no mandate” obtains. We follow Gould and Rablen (2016) in choosing the value of the
threshold parameter to be τ = 1/3.
The stochastic process that assigns UNGA members to the UNSC in Stage 2 is termed
the assignment process. For every year t, the assignment process induces a probability pijkt
that country aij is assigned to the UNSC in membership category k. The average assign-
ment probability of country aij on an infinite set of years t ∈ T is given by pij ¼ ET ;kðpijkÞ.
2.2 Equity concepts—a formalization
We denote the population of country aij as qij ∈ ℕ, and the population of region j as
qj ¼
P
aij2Rj qij. Let the absolute voting power of country aij under the CDP, if assigned to
the UNSC, be signified by bij.
6 The absolute voting power of region j under the RDP we
denote by bj. We measure absolute voting power in the Stage 1 vote with the “Banzhaf
measure for (j,k) simple voting games” given in Definition 3.4 of Freixas (2005).7
Under the assumption—termed uncorrelated preferences (UC)—that every world citi-
zen votes independently, and is equally likely to vote for each of the given voting
possibilities, Gould and Rablen (2016) prove that, for CE and RE to obtain, the following
conditions must hold8:
CE:
pijbijﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
qij
p is constant for all aij;
Footnote 5 continued
real in practice – that countries assigned to the UNSC in Stage 2 of the RDP might break ranks and vote
according to the preference of their own citizens rather than according to the outcome of the regional ballot.
This point underscores the need to understand both country and region concepts of equity.
6 The existing UNSC and the reforms to it we consider may all be analyzed without requiring country
voting power to be time-variant.
7 This measure assumes that each voting possibility is chosen with equal probability, which (as we shall
subsequently comment on) turns out not to apply to the Stage 3 vote. In Stage 3 we instead we employ the
“generalized Bz measure” of Lindner (2008), which allows for the (common) probability of voting “for” or
“against” to differ from the probability of voting “abstain”. Lindner’s measure collapses to that of Freixas
when every voting possibility is assigned the same probability.
8 The assumption of UC preferences is not to be understood as denying the possibility of preference
correlation, but instead harks to Bernoulli’s Principle of Insufficient Reason (BPIR), according to which
voting alternatives should be assigned equal epistemic probabilities if there is no known reason for assigning
unequal ones (see, e.g., Felsenthal and Machover 1997, 2003). Indeed, were preferences actually uncor-
related within countries and regions, then these constructs would be arbitrary and we would not witness the
fierce debates over regional and national representation that we actually observe in the UNSC reform debate.
For an analysis of UNSC reform that allows explicitly for preference correlation, see O’Neill (1996).
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RE:
bjﬃﬃﬃﬃ
qj
p is constant for allRj:
The condition for CE may be thought of as a probability-augmented version of Pen-
rose’s (1946) square-root rule: rather than requiring voting power when a UNSC member,
bij, to be inversely proportional to
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
qj
p
, it instead requires that expected voting power,
pijbij, have this property. Unlike for countries, when considering region equity, the
assignment probabilities play no role as each region is always represented on the UNSC,
and the identities of the countries that form the regional bloc are immaterial.
Under UC preferences, Gould and Rablen compute that countries will vote “for” and
“against” in the UNSC with an equal probability, given by 5/12 ≈ 0.42. The probability
that the Stage 1 vote results in the “no mandate” outcome, leading a country to abstain in
the UNSC, is therefore 1/6 ≈ 0.17. Thus, as seems realistic, abstention is chosen less often
than either of the remaining voting possibilities. Under the RDP, regional blocs vote
according to these same probabilities.9
2.3 Measuring deviations from equitability
We wish to measure, in an objective sense, the proximity of the UNSC (under different
reforms) to our two equity concepts. Accordingly, we adopt the metric
dðX;YÞ ¼ 1=2P jXi  Yij, where X and Y are unit-vectors. This corresponds to the
widely-used index of distortion, commonly attributed to Loosemore and Hanby (1971). We
then define proximity measures on the unit interval (where unity indicates maximal
proximity, and zero the minimum possible proximity) for our two equity concepts as
CEj jj j ¼ 1dðvCE; kÞ; REj jj j ¼ 1dðvRE; kÞ;
where vCE is the scaled 193 9 1 unit vector of the pijbij
 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
qij
p
, vRE is the scaled 193 9 1 unit
vector of the bj
 ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
qj
p
and λ is the 193 9 1 unit vector of the constant 1/193.
2.3.1 A composite measure
It is helpful for the purposes of comparison between reforms to have a single composite
measure of equity. To present our main results we utilize a weighted measure of the form
E ¼ /CE CEj jj j þ /RE REj jj j;
where /i is the preference weight assigned to equity concept i, with Ri/i ¼ 1. If the
preference weights over country and regional equity of world leaders were known, we
clearly would utilize them. As, however, they are not known, we weight these concepts
equally to reflect this Bernoullian uncertainty: ϕCE = ϕRE = ½. We shall, however, discuss
the qualitative changes to our main findings if these weights are made unequal.
2.4 Efﬁciency
Following Felsenthal and Machover (2007, 2009), we take the efficiency of a voting body
to refer to the efficiency with which its decision rule responds to the preferences of world
9 The actual rate of abstention in the UNSC is given in O’Neill (1996) as being around 2%. Our qualitative
results are robust, however, to rates of abstention below the assumed 17%.
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citizens. The more difficult, a priori, it is for a resolution to pass, the lower the efficiency of
the decision rule.10
Our formal measure of efficiency is based on the “power of a collectivity to act” (PTA)
of Coleman (1971), which is the a priori probability of a resolution being approved rather
than blocked. Coleman defined his PTA measure only for voting games with two voting
alternatives, i.e., {for, against}, however. Freixas (2012) generalizes Coleman’s measure to
allow for abstention, and we further generalize to allow the probability of abstention to be
distinct from the common probability of voting “for” or “against”. That is, we weigh each
winning tripartition by its probability of occurrence, instead of simply counting the number
of such tripartitions and dividing by 3N.11 As our equity measures are scaled to the unit
interval, but PTA lies on the interval (0, ½), we report 2PTA as our measure of efficiency.12
3 Proposed UNSC reforms
Since the 1990s many different proposals for a second reform of the UNSC have been
made.13 A difficulty, however, with taking these reform proposals themselves as the unit of
analysis is that most bundle changes to the UNSC’s rules (what we term “structural”
reforms) with expansion of the UNSC’s membership.14 Analysis of reform proposals is,
therefore, unable to isolate the effects owing to the structural reform component from those
owing to expansion.
A more informative approach—one that allows us to disentangle the effects of the
structural reforms separately from the effects of expansion—is to take individual structural
reforms as the unit of analysis. Accordingly, we analyze eight structural reforms (Appendix
1) contained within 11 reform proposals put forward by various actors within the UN
(Appendix 2).15 Note that—to eliminate any effects caused by expansion—each structural
10 Felsenthal and Machover (2007, 2009) consider two further measures of efficiency: the absolute and
relative sensitivity indices. As these typically correlate highly with PTA, however, we consider this measure
only.
11 For a good introduction to PTA, and its relationship to the Banzhaf index, see Leech (2002c).
12 The minimum and maximum possible values of PTA in a proper game when there are N voters are
PTAmin ¼ PrðforÞN and, when PrðforÞ ¼ PrðagainstÞ, PTAmax ¼ 1=2 1
PbN=2c
i¼0 Pr forð Þi

Pr abstainð ÞN2iPr againstð Þi N  2i; i; ið Þ!Þ. PTAmin, which converges to zero as N→∞, is attained under the
unanimity decision rule in which, for a resolution to pass, all members must vote in favor. PTAmax, which, if
PrðforÞ ¼ PrðagainstÞ, converges to ½ as N → ∞, is attained under the simple majority decision rule in
which the simple majority is taken over all members that do not abstain.
13 See, e.g., Hassler (2013), Cox (2009) and von Freiesleben (2008) for recent qualitative reviews of these
reform proposals.
14 The UNSC has not increased in size in line with the growth in UN membership: the ratio of UNSC
members to UN members has gone from 0.14 in 1966, to only 0.08 in 2012. Accordingly, there is wide-
spread agreement on the need to expand the membership of the UNSC (although by what degree is hotly
disputed).
15 We focus on the structural reforms associated with reform proposals that are sufficiently concrete to be
simulated. That rules out some recent, but vague, reform proposals, such as those found in OEWG (2008)
and in UfC (2010), and the two NAM reform proposals discussed in Weiss (2005, p. 18). We also omit a
number of structural reforms associated with UNSC reform proposals made by academics, notably Model C
(Hoffmann and Ariyoruk 2005), Model X (Hoffmann 2006), the REP proposal of Hartwig (2008), and the
reform proposals found in Russett, O’Neill and Sutterlin (1996), Schwartzberg (2003) and Strand and
Rapkin (2011). We do this as, so far as we know, none of these reform proposals is under detailed
consideration by UN members.
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reform in Appendix 1 holds the size of the UNSC constant at the present level of 15
members.
The earliest proposal for structural reform we consider is the creation of a new mem-
bership category that gives permanent membership of the UNSC, but not the right of veto
(Permanent Non-Veto Member—PNVM). The “2+3” reform proposal, which, according
to Davis (2010, p. 23), was put forward in 1995 by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
was one of the first to embrace the PNVM structural reform.16 The creation of a PNVM
category is also the only structural reform in the reform proposal, G4, of the “Group of
Four” (G4), comprised of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (G4 2006); and the 1997
reform proposal of Ismail Razali (Razali), then Chair of the OEWG (OEWG 1997).
Nearly all governments wish to abolish or limit the right of veto, which is viewed as an
unfair and anachronistic legacy of the Second World War (Fassbender 2004; Schwartzberg
2003). It is widely believed, however, that the five PMs would resist any such change
(Weiss and Young 2005). The position of the African Union (AU) is, therefore, that
although it opposes the right of veto, if some countries are to have the right of veto, then
this right must be extended. Accordingly, the AU reform proposal (AU 2005) has as its
structural reform the extension of the right of veto to 11 UNSC members (Veto+). As a
fallback position, the AU has joined with several other states (Italy, Mongolia, Singapore
and Tunisia), to advocate particular structural reforms aimed at weakening the right of
veto. In particular, we analyze the Weak Veto reform proposal (WV), which contains as its
structural reform that at least two PMs must vote against a resolution for it to necessarily
fail (Veto–).17
A further structural reform we consider is the redefining of the existing regional groups
(Regional Redeﬁnition—RR). In 2003, the then-UN Secretary-General set up the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP). The Panel’s report (HLP 2004)
contains two different reform proposals—HLPA and HLPB—each incorporating a modified
set of regions. While HLPA additionally allows for PNVMs, HLPB instead features two new
structural reforms. First, it calls for a new category of long-term NPM seats (Term+) with a
4-year term. Second, it proposes that the long-term NPM membership category allow
immediate re-election (Renew)—at present, NPMs must wait 1 year before seeking
reelection. Allowing renewable membership is also the principal structural reform in the
reform proposal of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group headed by Italy, denoted UfC
(UfC 2005). In 2007, Panama put forward a reform proposal (Panama) that also allows for
renewable membership, but with the twist that any member elected to the UNSC for four
consecutive terms would acquire PNVM status (Panama 2007).
We consider two further structural reforms, each associated with Italy (which plays an
especially active role in the UNSC reform debate). In Italy (2005), it published a reform
proposal (Italy) that, as its structural reform, creates a new category of seat that rotates
among the members of each regional group (Rotate). A more radical structural reform—
regional members (RM)—is to create a category of seat held by a region, rather than by any
individual country. In this vein, Italy has advocated the creation of a permanent European
Union (EU) seat on the UNSC, endowed with the right of veto (the EU reform proposal).18
In April 2011, this idea received the backing of the European Parliament, which passed a
16 For more on the origins of this reform proposal, see Fassbender (2004, p. 346) and Bourantonis (2005, p,
49).
17 Fassbender (2004, p. 351) and Wouters and Ruys (2005, p. 22) discuss further the origins of this reform
proposal.
18 See, e.g., Kirkup (2009).
Public Choice
123
resolution stating that “…a seat in an enlarged UNSC remains a central, long-term goal of
the European Union” (European Parliament 2011).19
Last, as in any appraisal exercise, we consider the “do nothing” structural reform,
named Present. The reform proposal associated with Present we refer to as Status quo.
A summary of the structural reforms and their associated reform proposals is given in
Table 1:
4 Simulation
To measure proximity to CE requires estimates of the pij under each structural reform. We
obtain these estimates through computer simulation of the UNSC assignment process
(under each structural reform, and at each degree of expansion) over 100,000 simulated
years. In this section, we detail our implementation of this simulation exercise.
We model the UNSC assignment process for all members excluding the PMs (for whom
pij ¼ 1) by first giving each country a probability, ρij ∈ [0,1] (where
P
aij2Rj qij ¼ 1), with
which it will be assigned to the UNSC if (i) it competes with all other members of its
region; and (ii) only a single seat is being assigned.
We use the empirical estimates of the ρij given in Table 1 of Gould and Rablen (2016).
These are computed from the empirical analysis of election to the UNSC of Dreher et al.
(2014), which shows that three country characteristics systematically predict UNSC
election: population, gross national income per capita and waiting time since last serving
on the UNSC. The precise details of the simulation model that the empirical estimates of
the ρij are fed into to yield estimates of the pij will not be of interest to all readers, so these
are relegated to Appendix 3.
4.1 Structural reforms and expansion
We would like to identify the effects of each structural reform, s, in isolation of the effects
of expansion. We therefore create the CVG Cs associated with each structural reform s. For
example, CPNVM, is created from CPresent by reducing by one the number of NPM seats for
Africa, Asia, GRULAC and the WEOG in the present UNSC, and adding one new PNVM
Table 1 Structural reforms and
associated reform proposals
Structural reform Associated reform proposals
PNVM seats (PNVM) 2+3, G4, HLPA, Panama, Razali
Renewable seats (Renew) HLPB, Panama, UfC
Regional members (RM) EU
Regional rotating seats (Rotate) Italy
Region reallocation (RR) HLPA, HLPB
Increase term length (Term+) HLPB, Panama
Expand right of veto (Veto+) AU
Weaken right of veto (Veto–) WV
Do nothing (Present) Status quo
19 The EU already enjoys observer status in the UNGA under Resolution A/65/L.64/Rev.1 (UNGA 2011).
As an observer, the EU has the right to speak at UNGA meetings and to present proposals agreed by EU
members, but not the right to vote on resolutions and other substantive matters.
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seat for each of these regions. To then observe separately the effects of expansion, we
increase the size of the UNSC under each structural reform by adding new NPM seats one-
by-one until N = 30.20 We are obliged to specify how each additional seat is assigned to a
region. As the response of our measures varies greatly depending upon this factor, if
additional seats are assigned to regions according to a deterministic pattern, this introduces
a cyclical form of noise into our results that obscures almost entirely the underlying trend.
To uncover the trend, therefore, we assign each new seat to a region in a probabilistic
manner (in a manner we explain precisely in Appendix 3). Accordingly, we split the
100,000 simulated elections performed across different partitions of seats to regions. Our
reported results are the average values given by this process.21
4.2 Voting power and decision rule
At present, the UNSC decision rule requires, as a necessary condition, that nine of 15
members, i.e., 60%, vote in favor of a resolution for it to pass. Although it is conceivable that
this 60% thresholdmight be altered as part of a reformof theUNSC, the benchmark analysis is
performed here under the assumption that the 60% threshold remains unchanged. We shall,
however, comment on the implications of allowing this threshold to change.
As the UNSC is expanded beyond 15 seats, however, it is only possible to retain exactly
the ratio 9/15 = 0.6 when N, the number of UNSC members, is divisible by five. One
option, when N is not divisible by five, is to set the threshold number of members required
for a decision to pass, QN, such that the fraction QN/N is made as close as possible to 0.6.
This, however, again introduces noise into the results that obscures the underlying trend.
Instead we adopt a probabilistic approach that sets the threshold to the closest integer
values either side of 0.6N in such a way that the mean value of the threshold is
0.6N. Specifically, if 0.6N is an integer then QN = 0.6N; otherwise QN = 0:6Nb c with
probability 0:6Nd e − 0.6N, and QN = 0:6Nb c with probability 0:6Nd e − 0.6N. Again, our
reported results are averages over 100,000 iterations of this probabilistic process at each
degree of expansion. With the threshold thus specified, we compute the absolute voting
power of each category of UNSC membership using the method of generating functions
(see, e.g., Freixas 2012).
5 Results
Our main results are shown in Fig. 1. On the horizontal axis is our composite equity measure
E, and on the vertical axis is our efficiency measure 2PTA. As, however, 2PTA becomes very
close to zero as the UNSC is expanded, we show the logarithm of 2PTA for visual clarity.
The left-most point of each line in Fig. 1 records the equity and efficiency of the
unexpanded (15-member) UNSC under each structural reform. As we then incrementally
expand the membership of the UNSC, one member at a time, we form the locus of points
20 We do not analyze cases for which N [ 30 as there is broad agreement among UN members that, in
order to be able to perform its role effectively, the UNSC must have a limited number of members (e.g.,
Zifcak 2006). The largest UNSC expansion advocated in the reform proposals we consider is 11 new
members (AU), which would bring total membership to N = 26 countries.
21 Precisely, we realize marginally more than 100,000 periods, but discard the very earliest periods. This is
necessary as we begin with a UNSC containing just the PMs (with the remaining seats vacant). Hence, it
requires a number of years before the elected UNSC becomes filled with members. The number of initial
years we discard corresponds to twice the maximum term length.
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given by each line in Fig. 1. Thus, the right-most point of each line corresponds to the
maximally expanded UNSC with 15 additional members (30 members in total). Com-
parison of the left-most points of each expansion line therefore reveals the pure effect of
each structural reform separately from the effects of expansion. Comparison of the lines
away from the left-most point reveals the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC under
each structural reform.
The equity and efficiency measures for each UNSC reform proposal appear in Fig. 1 as
a point estimate, marked “9”.22 To help interpret the findings in Fig. 1 we show separately,
in Fig. 2, the two components of our summary equity measure (CE and RE) under each
structural reform.
5.1 Structural reforms
We begin with an appraisal of each structural reform (with no membership expansion). We
say that structural reform i “dominates” j if it holds that PTAi[ PTAj and Ei[ Ej, and that
structural reform i “weakly dominates” j if one or both of these inequalities is weak. In
Fig. 1, we shade the space that is dominated by Present (to the “south-west”), and the space
that dominates Present (to the “north-east”).
We see in Fig. 1 that one structural reform, Veto+ (under which six existing NPM seats
are replaced by six PM seats), is strictly dominated by Present. The effect of Veto+ upon
efficiency is deleterious: it reduces the a priori probability of a resolution being approved
from 1% at present to just 0.2%. Veto+ also leads to a decline in overall equity: Fig. 2
shows that RE is improved, but CE is worsened. The improvement in RE arises as Veto
+ gives four of its six new vetoes to countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa
and Asia. The worsening against CE, which turns out to be the dominant effect, arises as
Veto+ concentrates (rather than dilutes) expected voting power in the hands of the (ex-
panded) set of PMs.
A further five structural reforms are weakly dominated by Present: these are PNVM,
Renew, RM, Rotate and Term+. Each of these five structural reforms affect only the
probabilities of assignment to the UNSC, leaving voting rights unchanged. It follows that
each of these structural reforms leave the efficiency of the UNSC unchanged. With the
exception of RM, which modifies the existing regional structure by making the EU a single
actor, the remaining four structural reforms also leave regional equity unchanged, thereby
only altering country equity.
The worst of these five structural reforms (i.e., the one weakly dominated by the
remaining four) is seen to be PNVM, under which four NPM seats are converted into
PNVM seats. The reform is associated with a marked worsening of CE as it concentrates
(when it would ideally dilute) the distribution of expected voting power across countries.
The second-worst of the five structural reforms that are weakly dominated by Present is
Rotate, under which NPM seats are replaced with seats that rotate within regions. Rotate
worsens CE as it as does not shift expected voting power away from the PMs to the
remainder of the UN membership (as would be desirable), but instead reallocates
(equalizes) expected voting power within those remaining members. This equalization of
22 Note that, in Fig. 1, not all reform proposals lie on a line associated with a structural reform. There are
two reasons for this. Most straightforwardly, some reform proposals combine more than one structural
reform, and therefore appear somewhere between the relevant lines. A second reason is that some reform
proposals yield expansion proportions (in terms of the proportion of new NPM seats that are allocated to
each region) that are different from the “optimal” proportions we employ in the simulation (see Appendix 3).
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expected voting power is counterproductive, however, for under CE more populous
countries warrant greater expected voting power than less populous countries.
The next worst structural reform weakly dominated by Present—Renew—allows
reelection as a NPM. Again, Renew alters only proximity to the CE concept. The wors-
ening against this concept arises as permitting reelection benefits disproportionately those
countries that gain election more often, but Gould and Rablen (2016) show that such
countries already receive at least their equitable level of expected voting power.
Accordingly, those countries with higher assignment probabilities become overrepre-
sented, thereby exacerbating the underrepresentation of the remaining countries.
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Next in the chain of weak dominance is RM, under which EU members would vote as a
single PM. Our modelling of this structural reform utilizes the anticipated membership of
the EU as of April 2019 onwards, by which time the United Kingdom will no longer be an
EU member state.23 According to Fig. 2, the principal effect of this proposal is to worsen
regional equity. This arises as the membership of the EE group is reduced when the EU
members are removed, causing the remaining members to become highly overrepresented.
This effect could be mitigated, however, if implementation of RM were bundled with an
appropriate rebalancing of the allocation of seats to regions.
The final structural reform in this group of five is Term+, under which some NPM seats
would have extended 8-year terms. As may be seen in Figs. 1 and 2, although the structural
reform worsens CE, the effect is only marginal: to a good first approximation Term+ has
simply no effect at all.24
One structural reform does succeed in weakly dominating Present: RR. Under RR, the five
existing regional groupings would reduce to four. This structural reform leaves voting rights,
and therefore efficiency, unchanged, but leads to substantial improvements in equity. The bulk
of the equity effect is seen in Fig. 2 to be at the region level, forRR disperses some of the excess
representationof theWEOGbymoving theUnitedStates andCanada into theAmericas group,
and countries such as Australia and New Zealand into the Asia and Pacific group.
Only one structural reform dominates Present: Veto–. Under Veto–, two PMs would need
to vote against a resolution for this to constitute an automatic veto. By reducing the
blocking power of each PM, Veto– increases the a priori probability of a resolution being
approved to 2.21%. The improvement in equity is attributable to discernible improvements
in both CE and RE. The former effect arises as Veto– succeeds in diluting the share of
expected voting power held by the PMs (through reducing their voting power); the latter
arises as the overrepresentation of EE and the WEOG is eased.
In summary, Veto– aside, the types of structural reform under consideration yield
modest, and often negative, effects on equity and efficiency.
5.2 Expansion
We now consider the effects of expanding the UNSC’s membership under each structural
reform. We say that structural reform i “expansion-dominates” j if it holds that
PTAi [ PTAj and Ei [ Ej for all expansions x = 0,1,…,15.
The effects of UNSC expansion are seen in Fig. 1 to be qualitatively similar under each of
the different structural reforms: expansion improves equity, but worsens efficiency. Figure 1
indicates that equity is increasing, but at a decreasing rate, in the size of the UNSC. There are,
thus, diminishing equity returns to expansion. Efficiency, however, is decreasing, and at an
increasing rate, in the size of the UNSC. Thus, incremental expansions of the UNSC generate
increasingly large efﬁciency losses, and increasingly small equity gains. In spite of these
qualitative similarities, however, we do see some important quantitative differences in the
way expansion interacts with each structural reform, as we shall discuss below.
23 Prior to the United Kingdom expressing in 2016 its intention to leave the EU, RM stood to deliver
significant improvements to efficiency, for then the UK and France would have shared the EU veto, rather
than both wielding separate vetoes, thereby reducing the number of veto actors from five at present to four.
24 The slight worsening against CE is because longer NPM terms favor countries with higher assignment
probabilities at the expense of countries with lower assignment probabilities (which are already under-
represented). To see this, suppose a country is always elected as a NPM when it is eligible. Under the present
rules (2-year term), such a country would serve on the UNSC for two in every 3 years (67%). Were the term
increased to four years, such a country would serve on the UNSC for four in every five years (80%).
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One structural reform expansion-dominates all others: Veto–. In this sense, this struc-
tural reform wins out among those we consider. Alongside Veto–, one other structural
reform, RR, weakly dominates Present at each expansion.
Of the five structural reforms that are weakly dominated by Present in the unexpanded
UNSC, three (PNVM, Renew and Term+) are so dominated at every expansion. Note in
Fig. 1, however, that the expansion lines for the Rotate and RM structural reforms cross that
for Present, indicating that these two structural reforms bring stronger equity benefits from
expansion. In particular, if expansion is by six or more new members, RM—under which
the EU votes as a single actor—achieves greater equity than does Present.
The other remarkable feature of the expansion lines in Fig. 1 regards Veto+, which goes
from being the least equitable structural reform in the unexpanded UNSC to being the
second most equitable structural reform in the maximally expanded 30-member UNSC.
This arises as each increase in the number of NPMs incrementally lowers the voting power
of a PM, thereby improving proximity to CE. Veto+ benefits especially from this effect
owing to the large number of PMs (i.e., 11) it advocates.
5.3 Reform proposals
Last, we consider our results for the reform proposals. Recall that (i) these proposals
typically combine expansion of the UNSC with one or more structural reforms (as specified
in Appendix 2); and (ii) that each is represented by a “9” in Fig. 1. We say that a reform
proposal i “dominates” j if PTAi [ PTAj and Ei [ Ej.
Only one reform proposal dominates Status quo: WV. Under WV two PMs must vote
against a resolution for this to constitute a veto. Figure 1 shows that it is possible to
augment WV with a significant expansion of the UNSC’s membership (by as many as 13
members) while remaining in the region that dominates Status quo (shaded grey in Fig. 1).
Of the remaining reform proposals, bar EU, each improves upon equity relative to Status quo,
but—because of the added difficulty of achieving the required level of consensus within an
expanded body—worsens efficiency. Helpfully—given the proliferation of reform proposals—it
transpires that all but three of the reform proposals we consider can be demonstrated to be
dominated (and should, therefore, never be chosen). FromFig. 1we see thatPanama is dominated
by 2+3, which is itself dominated by WV. Razali and Italy both dominate G4 and UfC, but are
themselvesdominatedbyWV.HLPA isweaklydominatedbyHLPB, andEU is dominatedbyStatus
quo. The three undominated reform proposals are therefore found to beWV (as discussed above),
High-LevelPlanB (HLPB), and the reformproposal of theAfricanUnion (AU). FromFig. 1we see
that, of the threeundominatedproposals,WV is themost efficient,while theAUproposal is themost
equitable. TheHLPB proposal, underwhich the existing regional groupingswould be redrawn and
eight new renewable seats with 4-year terms created, emerges as a “middle” candidate, lying
between theWV andAU proposals on both the equity and efficiency dimensions.
5.4 Extensions
We now briefly consider how our results change if (i) world leaders are willing to reduce
QN/N—the proportion of the total votes required to be affirmative for a resolution to
pass—as part of a reform of the UNSC; or (ii) we vary the preference weights in the
construction of our composite measure of equity.
Beginning with the level of QN/N, were world leaders willing to lower this value below
the current level of 0.6, this would make it easier for resolutions to pass, and therefore raise
efficiency. As such, every expansion line and point estimate in Fig. 1 would shift upwards
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were we to assume a lower value of QN/N, but the relative comparisons between structural
reforms would be unaffected. We note, however, that there appears to be little appetite
among world leaders to reduce QN/N.
The effects of altering the preference weights in the construction of our composite
measure of equity may be inferred from Fig. 2. According to panel (a), Veto– and RR, and
the associated WV, HLPA, and HLPB reform proposals, would be the chief beneficiaries
from placing greater weight on country equity. The principal losers would be Veto+, and
the associated AU reform proposal. Conversely, Veto+ and the associated AU reform
proposal would be the principal beneficiaries if more weight were placed on regional
equity, while RM and the associated EU reform proposal, would be the principal losers.
6 Conclusion
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) plays an important role in ensuring global
peace—the bedrock of macroeconomic stability. Although reform of the UNSC is one of
the most pressing issues facing the international community, as yet no previous analysis
has appraised the options for UNSC reform against formal equity and efficiency desiderata.
In this paper, we attempted such an appraisal. Given that our analysis rests on a highly
simplified theoretical framework that makes use of strong “veil of ignorance” arguments, and
which adopts one particular notion of voting power (i.e., Banzhaf’s index, instead of, e.g., the
index of Shapley and Shubik 1954 employed in O’Neill 1996 and elsewhere), it is appropriate
to stress caution in the interpretation of ourfindings.This caveat notwithstanding, our approach
does yield a rich set of predictions for the effects of a wide range of UNSC reform proposals.
Although nearly all countries support expansion of the UNSC’s membership, thus far no
expansion has taken place, as some countries worry that an expansion-only reform would be
merely a “sticking plaster” that ultimately delayed the implementation of deeper “structural”
reforms. On the basis of our analysis, we concur that expansion at the levels currently under
consideration will provide only modest improvements in equity, and will also come at the
expense of efficiency, unless world leaders are also willing to lower the threshold for the
proportion of members that must vote in favor of a resolution for it to pass. By segregating the
effects of structural reform from those owing to expansion,we also find that, inmany cases, the
types of deeper structural reforms being proposed are in fact counterproductive in respect of
our metrics. As such, in these cases, a reform purely of membership expansion would actually
be preferable to expansion alongside structural reform.
The most promising reform proposal among those we consider is one in which two Per-
manent Members (PMs) would have to cast votes against a resolution to block it (WV). Its
success owes to the fact that, by reducing the voting power of thePMs, it dilutes the distribution
of expected voting power away from these countries. Regrettably, however, this reform pro-
posal appears stymied in the short- and evenmedium-term, for noPMiswilling to relinquish its
right of veto, and the constitutional ability of the PMs to retain these powers seems impreg-
nable.25 Accordingly, those hoping for a major change in the efficiency and equity of the
UNSC in the short-run are likely to be disappointed. On the other hand, despite their consti-
tutional power, Fassbender (2004) argues that, if the rest of theworld could agree on a common
way forward, the PMs would have little choice but to concede ground.
25 The San Francisco Declaration of 1945 ensures that a PM can veto questions of veto rights, for a PM
exercises a veto on all non-procedural matters and also on whether a matter is to be deemed procedural or
non-procedural (see, e.g., Ko¨chler 1995).
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We note that the Weak Veto reform proposal is by no means the only way of weakening
the veto right: other, potentially more acceptable, options that weaken the veto to a lesser
extent might profitably be explored by world leaders. On this point, Freixas (2005, p. 52)
shows that the present UNSC voting rule has a mathematical representation as a “weighted
(3,2) voting game” in the sense of Freixas and Zwicker (2003), given by
9; 1; 0;6ð Þ; . . .; 1; 0;6ð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
5
; 1; 0; 0ð Þ; . . .; 1; 0; 0ð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
10
2
4
3
5;
where nine is the threshold that must be achieved for a vote to pass, and the first, second
and third components of each vector denote the weights attached, respectively, to a vote
“for”, “abstain”, and “against”. Viewed in this way, a minimal reduction in veto rights can
be achieved by lowering the threshold from nine to eight, such that the negative vote of a
PM could be overturned only if all other UNSC members were to vote in favor.
The preceding point notwithstanding, it has not been our purpose to offer our own reform
proposal, merely to examine those put forward by actors within the UN itself. Going forward,
one might look for the “first-best” reform proposal that is “optimal” in respect of our notions
of equity and efficiency, or the optimal “second-best” reform that is as proximate as possible
to these concepts, when constrained to satisfy a “functionality” or “realpolitik” condition.
While these avenuesmust await a proper treatment, we believe that the present contribution at
least clarifies what (little) is achieved by the reform proposals presently on the table.
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Appendix 1
See Table 2.
Table 2 Structural reforms
Reform Details
PNVM Four new PNVM seats (replacing one NPM seat for each of Africa, Asia, the GRULAC and the
WEOG)a
Present Implement no structural reform
Renew All NPM seats made renewable
RM All EU members act jointly as a single PM with the right of veto within the WEOGb
Rotate Ten seats that rotate among the region members (replacing existing NPM seats)
RR New regional groupings: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the Americas (three NPMs for
Africa; 2.5 for each of the Asia and Pacific and the Americas; two for Europe)c
Term+ Eight seats with a 4-year term (replacing two NPM seats for each of Africa, Asia and the
GRULAC; one NPM seat for each of EE and the WEOG)
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Appendix 2
See Table 3.
Table 2 continued
Reform Details
Veto+ Six new PM seats with the right of veto (replacing two NPM seats for each of Africa and Asia;
one NPM seat for each of the GRULAC and the WEOG)d
Veto– Two PM votes against a resolution required to form a veto
a We assume that the PNVM seats are given to Nigeria in Africa, India in Asia, Brazil in the GRULAC, and
Germany in the WEOG
b As the prospect of reform to the UNSC before April 2019 seems remote, we take the EU membership to
be the current 28 EU members less the UK, which will have ceased to be an EU member state by this date
c These proportions are chosen to maintain, insofar as possible, the regional allocation of NPM seats
between the existing five regional groups. The two NPM seats currently allocated to the WEOG are split one
to Europe, and the other shared (rotated) between the Americas and Asia and Pacific (hence the fractional
number of NPMs for these two regions). The new regional groupings are based on the report of the UN’s
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP 2004). The report does not detail the precise
membership of each group, but does indicate the number of countries belonging in each (allowing some
inference to be made over the intended membership). We assume the Africa group to correspond to the
existing Africa group; the Europe group to correspond to the existing EE group and the European countries
in the WEOG; Asia and the Pacific to correspond to the existing Asia group with the addition of New
Zealand and Australia; and the Americas group to correspond to the existing GRULAC plus Canada and the
United States
d As this structural reform is associated with the AU reform proposal we follow Appendix 2 (note 2) in
assuming that the new PM seats are given to Nigeria and Egypt in Africa, India and Japan in Asia, Brazil in
the GRULAC and Germany in the WEOG
Table 3 Reform proposals
Proposal Details
2+3 Two new PNVM seats and three new NPM seats (one each for Africa, Asia and the GRULAC)a
AU Six new PM seats with the right of veto (two each for Africa and Asia; one each for the
GRULAC and the WEOG) and five new NPM seats (two for Africa; one each for Asia, EE and
the GRULAC)b
EU All EU members vote jointly as a single PM with the right of veto
G4 Six new PNVM seats (two each for Africa and Asia; one each for the GRULAC and the WEOG)
and four NPM seats (one each for Africa, Asia, EE and the GRULAC)c
HLPA New regional groupings: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the Americas. Six new PNVM
seats (two each for Africa and Asia and Pacific; one each for Europe and the Americas). A
total of 13 NPM seats (four for Africa and Americas; three for Asia and Pacific; two for
Europe)d
HLPB New regional groupings: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the Americas. Eight new
renewable seats with 4-year terms (two for each region). A total of 11 NPM seats (four for
Africa; three each for Asia and Pacific and the Americas; one for Europe)
Italy Ten new regional rotating seats (three each for Africa and Asia; two for the GRULAC; one each
for EE and the WEOG)e
Panama Six new renewable seats with 5-year terms (two each for Africa and Asia; one each for the
GRULAC and the WEOG) Any country elected for four consecutive terms to these new seats
to become a PNVM
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Appendix 3: Simulation model
Election of UNSC members
We begin by specifying, for each region, the number of seats of each membership category
that are to be assigned in a given year. We are obliged to do this as only a subset of UNSC
members complete their terms in a given year, so the timing of seats becoming vacant is
not unique. For instance, in the present UNSC the GRULAC and the WEOG both receive
two NPM seats: the GRULAC elects one of its seats each year—the sequence {1,1}—
whereas the WEOG elects both of its seats in odd years, and holds no elections in even
years—the sequence {2,0}. As, the WEOG aside, the remaining regions display a pref-
erence for temporal smoothing of seat vacancies, we choose the timing of seat assignments
to be that which is maximally smooth through time. Specifically, we look (under each
structural reform) for the set of sequences that (i) makes maximally smooth the number of
vacant seats per year within each region, and which (ii) also makes maximally smooth the
total number of seats becoming vacant per year across regions.26
Table 3 continued
Proposal Details
Status
quo
Do nothing
Razali Five new PNVM seats (two for Asia; one each for Africa, the GRULAC and the WEOG). Four
new NPM seats (one each for Africa, Asia, EE, the GRULAC)f
UfC All NPM seats to be renewable. Ten new renewable NPM seats (three each to Africa and Asia;
two for the GRULAC; one each for EE and the WEOG)g
WV Two PM votes against a resolution required to form a veto
a According to Davis (2010), Germany and Japan were widely seen as deserving the two NPVM seats. We
therefore allocate these seats on this basis
b As the identities of the new PMs is not specified, we assume that the new PM seats are allocated to Nigeria
and Egypt in Africa, India and Japan in Asia, Brazil in the GRULAC and Germany in the WEOG
c We assume the six new PNVMs to be the same six countries assumed to be PMs in the AU reform
proposal
d We assume that the six new PNVMs are identical those in the G4 reform proposal
e Italy (2005) terms the ten new seats as “Regional” seats. Rotation is not proposed explicitly, but,
according to Martini (2009: 7), is implicit in the Italian position
f Specifically, the reform proposal allocates two new PNVM seats to the “industrialized states”. According
to Macqueen (2010), these two seats were intended for Germany and Japan. The reform proposal then
allocates one PNVM seat to “developing states” in Africa, Asia and the GRULAC respectively. We allocate
these seats to Nigeria, India and Brazil respectively
g The UfC reform proposal we examine here supersedes two earlier reform proposals made by the UfC (the
“Blue” and “Green” Models). For a discussion of these reform proposals see Hoffmann and Ariyoruk (2005)
26 Specifically, we employ a lexicographic procedure in which, first, we identify the sets of sequences that
makes maximally smooth the number of vacant seats per year within each region. Second, among these sets
of sequences, we identify those that maximally smooth the total number of vacant seats across regions. Last,
if a unique set of sequences is not yet determined, a final choice is made according to a random draw from
the remaining sequence sets.
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Under current UNSC rules, the UNGA simultaneously elects new NPMs to the UNSC in
an annual ballot. In order to obtain a tractable electoral model for purposes of simulation,
however, we suppose that elections are conducted sequentially, with countries elected one-
by-one to each membership category in turn. As countries that win UNSC membership in
the category elected first become ineligible for election to the membership category elected
second, and so on, we assume that the elections for each membership category are held in
order of desirability, with seats belonging to the most desirable membership category
elected first. This assumption rules out the possibility that a country might not participate
in the elections for the membership category contested first so as to ensure eligibility for a
more desirable membership category to be contested later. Of the elected membership
categories, PNVM membership is deemed the most desirable, with further membership
categories ranked by term length (longer preferred to shorter), followed by renewable
status (renewable preferred to non-renewable). The least desirable membership category—
2-year term, non-renewable—is therefore elected last.27
If, in year t, there are njkt seats of membership category k to be filled by new members
from region j, then, in each of njkt rounds, there is a new realization of a random variable
that elects country aij with probability ρijk. A complication is that countries cannot have
dual membership on the UNSC, so, if the same country is elected in more than one round,
the process is repeated again in full until distinct countries are elected.
UNSC expansion
Under each structural reform, we denote the total number of UNSC seats (of all categories)
belonging to region j with a vector n0 ¼ n0Africa; n0Asia; . . .; n0WEOG
 T
. We allow each new
NPM seat to be allocated to region j with probability ψj, subject to the condition that, when
allocating x new NPM seats, the realized allocation γjx must satisfy cjxbwjxcfor all j.28
We divide the performed 100,000 realizations equally between each valid allocation.
How to choose the ψj? We note that one of our equity concepts—CE—is prescriptive
regarding the assignment of UNSC seats to regions. Gould and Rablen (2016) prove (see
their Proposition 4) that, under CE, the number of seats assigned to region j, nj, satisfies
29
nja
X
aij2Rj
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
qij
p
bij
for all j: ð1Þ
We choose the ψj separately for each structural reform. We do this as, to be scrupulously
fair in evaluating each reform proposal, it is appropriate to give regions that benefit
disproportionately from a given structural reform less weight in the subsequent expansion
27 The Rotate structural reform is the introduction of ten regional rotating seats to replace the ten existing
NPM seats. To analyze this structural reform, we draw, for each region, the countries one-by-one without
replacement under a uniform distribution to determine the order of rotation. In some instances, a country
may be elected to a more desirable membership category when its “turn” for a rotating seat comes, in which
case its turn as a rotating member is delayed until its UNSC term has ended. Similarly, a country may be
ineligible to serve on the UNSC when its “turn” for a regional seat comes, in which case its turn is delayed
until it becomes eligible.
28 Hence, we do not consider extreme divisions of seats to regions in which the number of new NPM seats
given to one or more region deviates significantly from its expected value ψjx.
29 Strictly, speaking, Gould and Rablen’s (2016) Proposition 4 proves this result under “strong” CE,
whereas here we employ what these authors term “weak” CE. It is straightforward to verify, however, that
the proof of their Proposition 4 extends to the weak case.
Public Choice
123
of the UNSC. Accordingly, for each structural reform, s, we compute the ψj such that the
UNSC attains the CE concept at the maximal expansion x = 193 − 15 = 178. To do this,
for each s, we (i) add 178 new NPM seats to n0 to give n178; (ii) compute the bij for n
178;
(iii) use (A.1) to determine the nj that implement CE for n
178; (iv) compute the vector of
implied xj: x = n
178 − n0; and (v) set ψj = (1/178)xj. Although there is some modest
variation across structural reforms, the typical values of the ψj yielded by this procedure
are: ψAfrica = 0.29, ψAsia = 0.36, ψEE = 0.09, ψGRULAC = 0.14, and ψWEOG = 0.12. Under
these proportions the first ten additional NPM seats would be allocated three to Africa, four
to Asia, and one to each of EE, the GRULAC and the WEOG.
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